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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XVII JUNE, 1932 No. 4
DEATH TRANSFER TAXATION OF STOCK: EFFECT AND
EXTENSIONS OF FIRST NATIONAL BANK V. MAINE
BY C. POWELL FORDYCE AND W. C. FORDYCE, JR.
This article deals with a recent decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States, namely, First National Bank of Boston,
Executor of the Estate of Edward H. Haskell, deceased, v. State
of Maine.' Briefly, this case holds that the imposition by a state
of a death transfer tax upon stock of a corporation of the tax-
ing state, owned by a non-resident decedent, is a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In addition to analyzing the opinion
of the Court, an attempt will be made to review the background
of this case, to point out its practical effects, and to consider
some of the legal extensions of the doctrines therein enunciated.
To understand the full significance of the First National case,
one must first study its background, and notice the developments
in the law of taxation which led up to it.
Real property has always been and still is taxable only by the
state in which it is located, and this is true both of direct prop-
erty taxes 2 and also of inheritance taxes.3
Tangible personal property initially was subject to a property
tax where it was more or less permanently located, 4 and also at
the domicile of the owner.5 However, in 1905 the Supreme Court
of the United States, in the case of Union Refrigerator Transit
1 (1932) 52 S. Ct. 174.
2 26 R. C. L. 269.
3 26 R. C. L. 211, 212.
4 Hoyt v. Commissioner of Taxes (1861) 23 N. Y. 224.
5 Bemis v. Board of Aldermen (Mass. 1867) 14 Allen 366; see Boyd v.
Selma (1892) 96 Ala. 144, 150, 11 So. 393; and Goodrich, CONFLICT oF
LAWS (1927) 69.
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Co. v. Kentucky,6 held that if such property had acquired a tax-
able situs in another state, it was taxable only by said state, and
not by the state where the owner resided. A similar change took
place in regard to inheritance taxation of such property.
Originally it was taxable where it was located,7 and at the
domicile of the decedent.8 However, in 1925 the Supreme Court
in the case of Frick v. Pennsylvania,9 held that such property
was subject to an inheritance tax only in the state where it had
an actual situs.
The taxation of intangible personal property went through
much the same process of development. Prior to January 6,
1930, when the Supreme Court decided the case of Farmers
Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota'° bonds and debts were subject
to death transfer taxes in four places, viz.: (a) at the domicile
of the owner, (b) at the debtor's domicile, (c) where the instru-
ments were found-physically present, and (d) where the owner
had caused them to become an integral part of a localized busi-
ness." Likewise, prior to that time the transfer at death of
stock was considered subject to inheritance taxation in four
places, viz.: (a) at the domicile of the owner, 12 (b) where the
corporation was incorporated,' 3 (c) where the certificates were
found-physically present,14 and (d) where the owner had
caused them to become an integral part of a localized business.15
On January 6, 1930, however, the Supreme Court in the Farm-
ers Loan & Trust case clearly held that only one stafe, that of
the domicile of the owner, could levy an inheritance tax upon
6 (1905) 199 U. S. 194.
7 Barclay's Trustee v. Commonwealth (1913) 156 Ky. 455, 161 S. W.
510; People v. Griffith (1910) 245 Ill. 532, 92 N. E. 313; and Floyd v. Dis-
trict Court (1910) 41 Mont. 357, 109 Pac. 438. See Kroeger, Constitutional
Limitations of State Jurisdiction Over Property for Succession Tax Pur-
poses (1929) 14 ST. Louis L. REV. 99.
3 26 R. C. L. 210.
9 (1925) 268 U. S. 473.
10 (1930) 280 U. S. 204.
"1 Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minn. (1930) 280 U. S. 204, 209, 210;
note (1930) 15 ST. Louis L. REV. 273.
12Note (1926) 42 A. L. R. 330; Bullen v. Wisconsin (1916) 240 U. S.
625, 631; Blodgett v. Silberman (1928) 277 U. S. 1, 18.
'"Note (1926) 42 A. L. R. 365.
14 Note (1926) 42 A. L. R. 380.
"S 26 R. C. L. 214. See also 42 A. L. R. 389.
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registered or unregistered bonds and certificates of indebtedness.
This principle was applied again in Baldwin v. Missouri, decided
on May 26, 193016 to cover other intangibles, viz., debts owed by
Missouri residents to an Illinois decedent, coupon bonds of the
United States, and notes made by Missouri citizens which were
secured by liens upon Missouri real estate and were payable to
said decedent. The fact that these notes and bonds were physi-
cally present in Missouri at the time of death was held not to be
important. Subsequently, on November 24, 1930, this rule was
again invoked in Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission17
to prevent South Carolina from levying any inheritance tax upon
a debt owed by a South Carolina corporation to the majority
stockholder thereof who was domiciled in Illinois at his death. In
all of these decisions the question of the taxability of intangibles,
which had a business situs separate from the domicile of the
owner was excepted. These 1930 decisions established a new
rule for the inheritance taxation of intangible property.
Such was the state of the decisions prior to 1931. In that
year several state courts were called upon to decide the applica-
bility of the principles set forth in the Farmers'Loan & Trust,
Baldwin and Beidler cases to the inheritance taxation of stock.
Such courts unanimously agreed that the aforementioned Su-
preme Court cases could not be thus extended.18 A variety of
reasons were given for this conclusion. 19 These reasons had re-
16 (1930) 281 U. S. 586.
17 (1930) 282 U. S. 1.
Ia State of Maine v. First National Bank of Boston (1931) 130 Me. 123,
154 At. 103; In re Lund's Estate (1931) 183 Minn. 368, 236 N. W. 626;
In re Sachs' Estate (1930) 247 N. Y. S. 189, 138 Misc. 806, aff'd (1931)
250 N. Y. S. 113, 232 App. 433; Estate of Sanderson (N. Y. 1932) not yet
reported except by Commerce Clearing House Inheritance Tax Service
1930-32 par. 6380; Gates v. Bank of Commerce (Ark. 1931) not yet re-
ported except by Commerce Clearing House Inheritance Tax Service 1930-
32 par. 6407; Equitable Trust Co. v. Tax Commission of Kentucky (Ky.
App. 1931) not yet reported except by Commerce Clearing House Inherit-
ance Tax Service 1930-32 par. 6518; City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Tax
Commission of Ohio (Ohio 1932) not yet reported. Cf. also Guaranty Trust
Co. of New York v. State (1930) 36 Ohio App. 45, 172 N. E. 674.
19 Thus in State v. First National Bank of Boston, supra n. 18, the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Maine said that stock in corporations organized
under Maine law constituted property within Maine, and that, as Maine
granted a privilege essential to the complete devolution of the title to the
stock, it could exact a quid pro quo in return. In re Lund's Estate, supra
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ceived judicial sanction for many years. 20 They had even been
approved by the Supreme Court of the United States in Frice
v. Pennsylvania, in which the court declared that Pennsylvania,
the domicile of the decedent, must permit the deduction of in-
heritance taxes paid to West Virginia, Kansas and other states
upon the testamentary transfer of stock of corporations organ-
ized under their laws. Such other taxes were characterized as
paramount taxes, as claims superior to that of Pennsylvania,
and as within the power of such states. Similarly, as dicta, Chief
Justice Taft, in Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton,2 1
said: "So, too, it is well established that the state in which a
corporation is organized may provide in creating it for the tax-
ation in that state of all its shares, whether owned by residents
or non-residents."
In spite of these decisions, however, it was predicted by some
that the same considerations which moved the Supreme Court
to protect bonds, notes, and debts,-all intangible choses in
action-against unjust and discriminatory double taxation,22
n. 18, the Supreme Court of Minnesota argued that stock has a situs for
inheritance tax purposes at the domicile of the corporation, distinguished
between stocks and bonds by saying that the property interest in the latter
was located at the domicile of the creditor, and said that stock represented
an interest in the property of the corporation. In Gates v. Bank of Com-
merce, supra n. 18, the Supreme Court of Arkansas justified the tax upon
the ground that as the corporation was a creature of its laws, it controlled
the relationship between the corporation and the stockholders. In re Sachs'
Estate, merely cited and relied upon the older New York case of In re
Bronson (1896) 150 N. Y. 1, 44 N. E. 707, in which the court sustained
the imposition of the tax upon the transfer of stock, while exempting the
transfer of bonds, in part upon the theory that each share of stock repre-
sented distinct interest in the whole of the corporate property, and thus
was within the jurisdiction of the state of incorporation.
20 See for example cases listed in note (1926) 42 A. L. R. 365. See also
Tappan v. Merchants Nat'l Bank (1874) 19 Wall. 490; Travelers Ins. Co.
v. Conn. (1902) 185 U. S. 364; and Corry v. Baltimore (1905) 196 U. S.
466.
21 (1926) 270 U. S. 69, 81.
22 Thus in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minn., supra, n. 11, the Court
said that the doctrine, that choses in action ordinarily are subject to tax-
ation both at the debtor's domicile and at the domicile of the creditor, was
supported by Blackstone v. Miller (1903) 188 U. S. 189, and certain ap-
proving opinions, but that such doctrine had disturbed the good relations
among states, had produced discontent of a kind expected to subside with
the formation of the Union, had a bad practical effect, and had caused
nearly two-thirds of the states to try to avoid the consequences thereof by
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would likewise cause the Court to accord a similar measure of
protection to stock, which, of course, is also a species of intangi-
ble property. Such predictions proved sound.
Let us now analyze the First National decision. E. H. Haskell
died testate while domiciled in Massachusetts. He owned stock
in a Maine corporation, which had most of its tangible property
in that state. The stock certificates were kept in Massachusetts,
which state imposed an inheritance tax upon the transfer there-
of. Maine attempted to do likewise, after allowing the Massa-
chusetts tax as a credit upon its tax. The highest court of
Maine sustained the tax, holding that the shares were property
within its jurisdiction under applicable statutes, 23 and that the
resort to reciprocal exemption laws. The Court also declared that under
currently accepted views, bonds were taxable at four different places, and
characterized those views as startling and based upon a wrong premise..
It further said that the passing of primitive conditions as to intangible
wealth, and the fact that much of the country's wealth was invested in
negotiable securities, made protection of it against unjust and oppressive
taxation by two states a matter of greatest moment. And finally, after
stating that laws in respect of taxation should be construed and applied to
avoid unjust and oppressive consequences, the Court said:
We have determined that in general intangibles may be properly
taxed at the domicile of their owners and we can find no sufficient rea-
son for saying that they are not entitled to enjoy an immunity against
taxation at more than one place, similar to that accorded to tangibles.
All of these arguments applied equally to inheritance taxation of stock.
The evil effects of multiple inheritance taxation of it had long been bitterly
denounced (see pamphlet of Finance Department of Chamber of Commerce
of the United States, Sept. 1928, entitled State Taxes, Local, No. 4; and
comment (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 99). Reciprocal exemption laws generally
treated it in the same manner as bonds. Stocks, like bonds, were generally
held to be subject to an inheritance tax at four places (see notes 12, 13, 14
and 15.). Primitive conditions had passed as to stock. Thus, while 433,
448, 561 shares were listed on the New York Exchange on January 1, 1925,
this number had increased to 1,314,158,762 on April 1, 1932 (New York
Stock Exchange Bulletin for April 1932). Furthermore, much of the
country's wealth is invested in stock. Even after a declining market of
long duration the total market value of all shares listed on the New York
Stock Exchange on April 1, 1932 amounted to $24,501,826,280. (New York
Stock Exchange Bulletin for April 1932.)
23 R. S. Me. (1916) c. 69 sec. 1 provides: "All property within the juris-
diction of this state, and any interest therein, whether 'belonging to in-
habitants of this state or not, and whether tangible or intangible, which
shall pass by will, by the intestate laws of this state, . . . shall be sub-
ject to an inheritance tax for the use of the state as hereinafter pro-
vided . . ."
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Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution was not
violated. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case.
The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Sutherland.
Justices Stone, Holmes and Brandeis dissented.
To sustain his conclusion, Justice Sutherland said that it
might be conceded that decisions rendered before the Farmers
Loan & Trust case would preclude a successful challenge to the
judgment of the Maine Supreme Court; that most of these cases
were based upon Blackstone v. Miller,2 4 which had been over-
ruled in the Farmers Loan & Trust case; that Frick v. Pennsyl-
vania was one of the latest to approve the Blackstone case and
to give countenance to the general doctrine that intangible prop-
erty, unlike tangible property, might be subjected to a death
transfer tax in more than one state, but that this and all other
instances of such approval, whether express or tacit, with the
overthrow of the foundation upon which they rest, had ceased
to have other than historic interest. Justice Sutherland then
reviewed the Farmers Loan & Trust, Baldwin and Beidler de-
cisions, and stated that they established the rule that bonds,
notes and credits are subject to the imposition of an inheritance
tax only by the state of the domicile of the deceased owner, and
-said:
The rule of immunity from taxation by more than one
state, deducible from the decisions in respect of these
various and distinct kinds of property, is broader than the
applications thus far made of it. In its application to death
taxes, the rule rests for its justification upon the funda-
mental conception that the transmission from the dead to
the living of a particular thing, whether corporeal or in-
corporeal, is an event which cannot take place in two or
-nore states at one and the same time. In respect of tangible
property, the opposite view must be rejected as connoting a
physical impossibility; in the case of intangible property,
it must be rejected as involving an inherent and logical self
contradiction. Due regard for the processes of correct
thinking compels the conclusion that a determination fixing
the local situs of a thing for the purpose of transferring it
in one state carries with it an implicit denial that there is a
local situs in another state for the purpose of transferring
the same thing there. The contrary conclusion as to in-
24 (1903) 188 U. S. 189.
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tangible property has led to nothing but confusion and in-
justice by bringing about the anomalous and grossly unfair
result that one kind of personal property cannot, for the
purpose of imposing a transfer tax, be within the jurisdic-
tion of more than one state at the same time, while another
kind, quite as much within the protecting reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment, may be, at the same moment, with-
in the taxable jurisdiction of as many as four states, and
by each subjected to a tax upon its transfer by death, an
event which takes place, and in the nature of things can take
place, in one of the states only.
A transfer from the dead to the living of any specific
property is an event single in character and is effected under
the laws, and occurs within the limits, of a particular state;
and it is unreasonable, and incompatible with a sound con-
struction of the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to hold that jurisdiction to tax that event may
be distributed among a number of states.
We conclude that shares of stock, like the other intangi-
bles, constitutionally can be subjected to a death transfer
tax by one state only.
The question remains: In which state, among two or
more claiming the power to impose the tax, does the taxable
event occur? In the case of tangible personalty, the solu-
tion is simple: the transfer, that is, the taxable event, oc-
curs in that state where the property has an actual situs,
and it is taxable there and not elsewhere. In the case of
intangibles, the problem is not so readily solved, since in-
tangibles ordinarily have no actual situs. But it must be
solved unless gross discrimination between the two classes
of property is to be sanctioned; and this court has solved it
in respect of the intangibles heretofore dealt with by ap-
plying the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam. Farmers
Loan Co. v. Minnesota, supra, at pp. 211-212; Baldwin v.
Missouri, supra; Beidler v. So. Car. Tax Commission,
supra...
The considerations which justify the application of the
fiction embodied in the maxim to death transfer taxes im-
posed in respect of bonds, certificates of indebtedness, notes,
credits and bank deposits, apply, with substantially the
same force, in respect of corporate shares of stock. And
since death duties rest upon the power of the state impos-
ing them to control the privilege of succession, the reasons
which sanction the selection of the domiciliary state in the
various cases first named, sanction the same selection in
the case last named. In each case, there is wanting, on
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the part of a state other than that of the domicile, any real
taxable relationship to the event which is the subject of the
tax. Ownership of shares by the stockholder and owner-
ship of the capital by the corporation are not identical.
The former is an individual interest giving the stockholder
a right to a proportional part of the dividends and the ef-
fects of the corporation when dissolved, after payment of
its debts. The Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206, 229-
230; Rhode Island Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69, 81;
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 213-214. And this
interest is an incorporeal property right which attaches to
the person of the owner in the state of his domicile. The
fact that the property of the corporation is situated in an-
other state affords no ground for the imposition, by that
state, of a death tax upon the transfer of the stock. Rhode
Island Trust Co. v. Doughton, supra. And we are unable
to find in the further fact of incorporation under the laws
of such state, adequate reason for a different conclusion...
Practical considerations of wisdom, convenience and
justice alike dictate the desirability of a uniform general
rule confining the jurisdiction to impose death transfer
taxes as to intangibles to the state of the domicile; and these
considerations are greatly fortified by the fact that a large
majority of the states have adopted that rule by their re-
ciprocal inheritance tax statutes. In some states, indeed,
the rule has been declared independently of such reciprocal
statutes. The requirements of due process of law accord
with this view:
We do not overlook the possibility that shares of stock,
as well as other intangibles, may be so used in a state other
than that of the owner's domicile as to give them a situs
analogous to the actual situs of tangible personal property.
See Farmers Loan Company case, supra, at p. 213. That
question heretofore has been reserved, and it still is re-
served to be disposed of when, if ever, it properly shall be
presented for our consideration.
The practical effects of the First National decision are many.
In the first place, it establishes national reciprocity of exemp-
tion from death transfer taxes upon stock owned by non-
resident decedents, a result which the legislatures of the ma-
jority of states have been struggling to accomplish for many
years. By doing so it supplants the statutes on this subject
passed by these states, 25 and effectively ends the power of the
25 The Missouri Reciprocal Exemption Statute is R. S. Mo. (1929) sec.
576.
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non-reciprocating states to collect inheritance taxes from the
legal representatives of deceased non-residents. To executors
and administrators who find among the assets of their decedent
stocks of corporations organized in one of the latter states, this
decision is of great benefit. It relieves them of the burdens and
expense which were formerly necessary in order to compute and
pay foreign inheritance taxes--business situs excepted.26  It
ends their personal liability for such taxes. It prevents the
possibility that they will have to bring or defend foreign suits
involving disputes and conflicting theories as to the value of
stock; and as to whether transfers were made in contemplation
of, or to take effect in possession or enjoyment at, death. And
it does much to shorten the delays of administration-delays
which in the past frequently kept them from selling stock at
advantageous times and prices, and from paying foreign inherit-
ance taxes within the three-year period required for securing
credit upon the federal estate tax. In addition, this decision is
advantageous to those who inherit broperty. Because it short-
ens the delays and lessens the expenses and taxes connected
with the administration of estates, such persons will receive
more of their ancestor's property, and will be entitled to the
beneficial enjoyment thereof much sooner than in the past.
In the second place, this decision will decrease the future in-
heritance tax returns of less populous states, and correspond-
ingly increase the revenue derived from this source by the larger
states. Although this result has been imposed upon some
26 According to correspondence received by Prentice-Hall from the
various state authorities, and reported in that company's Inheritance Tax
Service, Vol. 1, Matters Affecting Several Jurisdictions, par. 21, the fol-
lowing states and territories still require the legal representatives of non-
resident decedents to secure waivers of inheritance taxes: California, Colo-
rado, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas and Wyoming. Illinois requires waivers
only from representatives of decedents domiciled in the non-reciprocating
states, viz: Arizona, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana and Utah.
State authorities of Maine and Minnesota do not require waivers, but say
that the transfer agents of corporations organized under their laws
probably will require them. States other than those listed do not require
waivers since the First National Bank case was decided on Jan. 4, 1932.
It is thought that the states which still require waivers, insist upon them
in order to be sure that the stock has no actual business situs in the state,
or in order to receive information which will make possible the protection
of local creditors. No other sound reason exists for such action.
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against their will, it is a result which the large majority con-
sidered necessary and desirable when they voluntarily adopted
their reciprocal exemption statutes. Moreover, it should be
noted that this case facilitates the smooth working of our
Federal system of government by preventing individual states
from subordinating the general welfare to their own selfish
interests-a tendency which was expected by Alexander Hamil-
ton to subside with the formation of the Union. 27
In the third place, the First National case, by preventing liens
for inheritance taxes upon stock, will cause this form of security
to play an even greater part in the financial and credit structures
of our country. This result is in accordance with the move-
ment which brought about the adoption of Uniform Stock
Transfer Acts in twenty states, 28 under which liens not ex-
pressed on the face of the certificate are generally disregarded.
The need for such a result was well expressed in Masury v.
Arkansas National Bank, et al.,29 in which it was said:
It is a well-known fact that stock certificates frequently
circulate in places far remote from the home of the cor-
poration by which they were issued; that in all commercial
centers they are commonly transferred from hand to hand
like negotiable paper, and that they are hypothecated for
temporary loans by simple endorsement and delivery there-
of, the latter being perhaps the most common use to which
such securities are put. In the great majority of cases,
when stock is pledged for a loan, no record of the transfer
is made on the books of the corporation, and in the judg-
ment of laymen the making of such a record seems to be a
needless formality. The trend of modern decisions has
been to encourage the free circulation of stock certificates
in the mode last indicated, on the theory that they are a
valuable aid to commercial transactions, and that the pub-
lic interest is best subserved by removing all restrictions
against their circulation, and by placing them as nearly as
possible on the plane of commercial paper.
27 See THE FEDERALISTS, No. 7, referred to by the Supreme Court in the
Farmers Loan & Trust case, n. 11 above.
28 See Christy, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK, 770 note, which shows that the
following states and territories have adopted such acts: Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin.
29 (C. C. A. 8, 1899) 93 F. 603, 607.
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In the fourth place, the First National case nullifies many
other state inheritance tax statutes in so far as they impose an
inheritance tax upon stock. Those which, like that of Maine,30
declares that all property within the jurisdiction of the state
shall be subject to tax, can no longer be regarded as effective.
And by striking down these statutes, this case also vitiates the
statutes passed to force foreign executors to pay the tax. Such
statutes usually provide that the executors are personally liable
for the tax,3 1 and that corporations which transfer stock for
them without first giving notice to the State Treasurer and At-
torney General of the intended transfer, and without first se-
curing a waiver of the tax or receipt therefor from such officials,
shall be liable for a fine and for the amount of the tax.32 Need-
less to say, this result is of great advantage to such executors
and corporations. That this is the result of the First National
decision, in so far as the Missouri statutes are concerned, was
directly held in the case of Turner et al. v. Shartel et al., which
was decided by a special statutory three-judge Federal Court on
April 2nd of this year.33
And in the fifth place, the First National decision may become
the basis for securing substantial refunds of taxes paid under
the old theories of taxation. To discuss in detail the statutory
requirements of each state, would unduly lengthen this article.34
0 N. 23 above. Similarly, R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 570, provides in part as
follows: "A tax shall be and is hereby imposed upon the transfer of any
property, real, personal or mixed . . . in the following cases:...
When the transfer is by will or intestate law of property within the state
or within the jurisdiction of the state and the decedent was a non-resident
of the state at the time of his death."
1 R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 579, in part provides as follows: "All executors,
administrators, and trustees of any estate, property, interest therein, or
income therefrom, so transferred, shall be personally liable for such tax
and interest until they are paid . . ."
2 R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 583, provides that Missouri corporations which
fail to take these precautions shall be liable to the payment of the amount
of the tax and interest, including the charges of capital stock of the cor-
poration, and in addition thereto a penalty of $1000, and that the payment
of such tax, interest, or penalty, or both, may be enforced in an action
brought by the State Treasurer in any court of competent jurisdiction.
3 Not yet reported.
4 Those interested should consult an article by Oliver P. Field, The Re-
covery of Illegal and Unconstitutional Taxes (1932) 45 HARv. L. REV. 501,
in which the author exhaustively discusses the legal difficulties confronting
those who attempt to secure refunds.
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It should be noted, however, that taxes voluntarily paid probably
cannot be recovered from Arizona, Arkansas, California, Flor-
ida, Idaho, Illinois or Missouri; that there are no statutory pro-
visions for refund in Alaska, Kansas (after payment into the
state treasury), Maine, Michigan (where paid under a mistake
of law), Ohio, Texas and Washington (where paid under a mis-
take of law); and that while refunds may be recovered from
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, New York,
North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah and Wisconsin,
the time for making claims therefor is strictly limited.35 More-
over, it should be remembered that in most states refund claims,
even though allowed, will usually not be paid unless and until
the legislatures appropriate money for this purpose.3 0
Before leaving our discussion of the practical effects of the
First National case, let us briefly consider the question of how
stock may be given a business situs. This question is important,
for, as pointed out above, the Supreme Court in the First Na-
tional, Farmers Loan & Trust, Baldwin and Beidler cases, as dicta,
intimated that an inheritance tax can be levied upon intangibles by
the state where they are given such a situs, regardless of where
the deceased owner is domiciled at his death. In view of the
fact that the Court in those decisions applied the same rules to
bonds, notes, credits, and stock, it may be safely assumed that
cases involving business situs of these first three kinds of in-
tangible property apply also to the fourth. According to Judge
Cooley3 7 there is no business situs in the following cases:
(a) Where the business transacted by the agent in the
foreign state is not continuous in character, as where there
35 Information received from state authorities by Prentice-Hall and re-
ported in their Inheritance Tax Service Vol. 1, Matters Affecting Several
Jurisdictions, par. 21.
86 In this connection it is well, also, to bear in mind that Article 9a of
Regulation 70 (1929 edition) promulgated under the Federal Revenue Act
of 1926, requires those securing refunds of state inheritance taxes, for
which credit has been allowed upon the federal estate tax, to report such
refunds to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and to pay additional federal
estate taxes, unless the statutes of limitation have run against the assess.
ment of such taxes. The federal statutes of limitation are contained in
secs. 310, 311, and 316 of the Revenue Act of 1926.
87 2 Cooley, THE LAW Op TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) 1037, et seq. See also
Robert L. Howard, Recent Developments and Tendencies in the Taxation
of Intangibles (1931) 32 Mo. LAW BuLL. 25.
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is merely a transitory presence of the agent in that state,
or merely temporary or isolated transactions. 38
(b) Where the agent in the foreign state is a mere cus-
todian for safekeeping, 3 9 clerk, or order taker.
(c) Where the agent or attorney in the foreign state is
merely one to make collections.
40
(d) Where no business is done in the foreign state by
the owner or his agent relative to the property taxed.
41
3" Cf. Martin v. Central Trust Co. of Ill. (1927) 327 Ill. 622, 159 N. E.
312, holding that certificates of stock, pledged by the testator to an Illi-
nois creditor and located in the State of Illinois at the time of the death of
the testator domiciled in New York, had no situs in Illinois for purposes
of ancillary administration, where the corporations were organized in other
states. See also Sanchez v. Bowers (D. C. N. Y. Mar. 23, 1932) not yet
reported except by Commerce Clearing House Federal Tax Service for
1932, Vol. 3 par. 9170.
39 Thus no claim of business situs was made by the United States in
Shenton v. United States (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 249, where war-
rants for stock in a Canadian corporation were held for safekeeping in
New York, for the account of a citizen of Great Britain domiciled in Hong
Kong at his death. Cf. Baldwin v. Missouri, n. 16 above, in which the Su-
preme Court held that mere presence of United States Government bonds,
and notes in Missouri, which were owned by an Illinois decedent, did not
give Missouri jurisdiction to levy an inheritance tax upon the testamentary
transfer thereof.
40 See Ewa Plantation Co. v. Wilder (C. C. A. 9, 1923) 289 F. 664, which
involved collections from bonds and notes. That the rule of this case ap-
plies to stock is indicated by two recent decisions of the U. S. Board of Tax
Appeals, viz., Brooks v. Commissioner C. C. H. no. 6688, 22 B. T. A. 71, and
Estate of Garvan v. Commissioner, infra n. 52. In the former case the
decedent, a citizen of Great Britain, was domiciled in Cuba at his death.
At that time he owned stock in a foreign corporation and bonds of both
foreign and domestic corporations, the paper evidences of which were held
for him in New York City for the sole purpose of having the income col-
lected and deposited to his credit in a checking account in New York banks.
The Board held that these securities were not a part of any business local-
ized in the United States and that they were not "situated" in the United
States within the meaning of sec. 303 (b), Revenue Act of 1926, subjecting
such property to the Federal Estate Tax. In the latter case the decedent
was domiciled in Australia at his death. He then owned stock in corpora-
tions organized in the United States, which was held by the First National
Bank of Boston for the purpose of collecting the income therefrom for the
account of the decedent. It was stipulated by the commissioner that these
certificates had no business situs in the United States.
41 In this connection it should be noted that in the amicus curiae brief
of the State of Minnesota, filed in the First National case, n. 1 above, it
was contended that stock has a business situs in the state of incorporation
merely because it is stock. The Supreme Court in its decision rightly
ignored this argument.
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(e) Where there is no agent in the state and the owner
comes into the state only occasionally.
On the other hand, it seems to be clearly established that stocks,
and other forms of intangible property, do acquire a business
situs when the agent of the non-resident exercises unlimited au-
thority given him to sell the property intrusted to his care and
reinvest the proceeds; to invest the income arising therefrom or
to deposit it to his principal's bank account; to pledge the prop-
erty for loans; to vote the stock; to attend shareholder's meet-
ings; and to do any and all other things as fully as the owner
thereof could do. 42 Moreover, business situs once acquired is
not lost because of temporary absence of the property from the
taxing state, and does not depend for its existence upon the
presence of an agent in such state.43 But if stock is given a sep-
arate business situs, and is there made subject to an inheritance
tax, it undoubtedly will not be held subject to a second tax at
the domicile of the owner.44
So much for the practical effects of the First National case.
What are the possible legal extensions of the doctrines therein
enunciated? It would seem that there are several.
Does the First National case apply where the decedent was
domiciled in a state which imposed no inheritance tax, or in a
42 Hill v. Carter (C. C. A. 9, 1931) 47 F. (2d) 869, certiorari denied
(1931) 52 S. Ct. 10. In this case the court held that because such powers
were given to a New York agent by one domiciled in Hawaii, the property
so held was not located in Hawaii for purposes of its income tax. See also
DeGaney v. Lederer (1919) 250 U. S. 376. Cf. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
of Baltimore,Md. v. Va. (1929) 280 U.S. 83, in which the court refused to per-
mit Virginia, the domicile of beneficiaries of a trust, to levy a property tax
upon the intangibles constituting the corpus of the trust which was held by
the trust company in Maryland. This case illustrates that the maxim
mobilia sequunter personam cannot be invoked to allow unjust and oppres-
sive double taxation, and that it is not of universal application in respect
to intangibles. Note 15 ST. Louis L. REv. 273.
432 Cooley, THE LAW OF TAxATIoN (4th ed. 1924) 1040.
44 This conclusion is reached in spite of the fact that in Cream of Wheat
Co. v. County of Grand Fork (1920) 253 U. S. 325, 330, Mr. Justice
Brandeis, in answer to an argument of counsel, said: "To this it is suffi-
cient to say that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit double tax-
ation." Although the Supreme Court has never flatly contradicted this
statement, in the First National Bank case, n. 1 above, the Court said:
"We conclude that shares of stock, like the other intangibles, constitu-
tionally can be subject to a death transfer tax by one state only."
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foreign country? While it is true that the case is based in part
upon the desire of the Supreme Court to extend to stock an im-
munity from inheritance taxation in more than one place, similar
to that accorded to tangibles, the keystone of the opinion is
found in the following language used by Justice Sutherland:
A transfer from the dead to the living of any specific
property is an event single in character and is effected under
the laws, and occurs within the limits, of a particular state;
and it is unreasonable, and incompatible with a sound con-
struction of the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to hold that jurisdiction to tax that event may
be distributed among a number of states.
And since death duties rest upon the power of the state
imposing them to control the privilege of succession, the
reasons which sanction the selection of the domiciliary state
in the various cases first named [those dealing with the in-
heritance taxes of bonds, certificates of indebtedness, notes,
claims and bank deposits], sanction the same selection in
the case last named [those dealing with the inheritance tax-
ation of stock]. In each case, there is wanting, on the part
of a state other than that of the domicile, any real taxable
relationship to the event which is the subject of the tax.
In view of this plain language, it seems clear that the First
National decision applies in spite of the fact that the decedent
was domiciled in a state imposing no inheritance tax, or in a
foreign country. 45
Does the First National Bank decision protect intangibles other
than stock from multiple inheritance taxation? If we consider
the broad general language used by the Court in this case, and
in the Farmers Loan & Trust case, this question obviously re-
quires an affirmative answer.40 The decisions speak of "in-
4 Nevertheless the Inheritance Tax Commission of Kansas (letter dated
February 13, 1932) has ruled that the First National case does not exempt
from tax stock owned by those domiciled in foreign countries at their death.
The Attorney General of Maine has made a similar ruling. However, re-
ciprocal exemption statutes generally put foreigners and nonresident citi-
zens of the United States upon the same basis. See R. S. Mo. (1929) sec.
576.
41 As pointed out in n. 18 above, the courts of many states refuse to ap-
ply the rule of the Farmers Loan & Trust, Baldwin and Beidler cases to
stock. This refusal caused the First National Bank case to be appealed
to the Supreme Court. A strenuous effort was made to confine the former
decisions to debts, upon the ground that all the property there is in a debt
is located at the domicile of the creditor, but the Supreme Court in the
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tangible" property, and do not confine the rules laid down to the
specific form of such property before the court.
What effect does the First National case, an inheritance tax
case, have upon jurisdiction for purposes of ancillary adminis-
tration in Missouri? Perhaps it has none, if we accept the state-
ment of Judge Learned Hand that stock may have a situs for
some purposes at the domicile of the corporation, and for other
purposes at the domicile of the owner.47 However, it seems
worthy of note that Justice Sutherland rejected the holding of
the Maine Supreme Court, that stock in a Maine corporation is
property within Maine, and said that the interest of a stock-
holder "is an incorporeal property right which attaches to the
person of the owner in the state of his domicile." If this state-
ment is applicable to the law of ancillary administration, and
means that stock is property only at the domicile of the owner,
then no property exists in the state of incorporation which can
be made the subject of such administration. But if this language
can be so construed, it must be taken as overruling Baker v.
Baker, Eccles Company48 in which the Court said that it was
clear that the state which creates a corporation has such control
over the transfer of its shares that it may administer upon the
shares of a deceased non-resident owner. The authority of the
Baker decision is undermined, however, by the fact that the
cases relied upon to support this holding 49 are inheritance tax
cases and are impliedly overruled by the First National case.
First National case brushed aside this argument, saying that the difference
between bonds and stock is more fanciful than real. For this reason it
would seem useless now to contend that any form of intangible property
is not within the scope of these decisions.
47 Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U. S. Steel Corp. (D. C. S. D.
N.Y. 1924) 300 F. 741, 746, aff'd (1925) 267 U. S. 22. And in this case
it was also pointed out that as a share is a legal relationship it can have
no spatial character except by virtue of the parties to the relationship; and
that wherever either party is, there is the property as respects such parts
of the relation as touch that party. See also Norrie et al. v. Kansas City
Southern Ry. Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 158, 159, ajJ'd Norrie
v. Lohman (C. C. A. 2, 1926) 16 F. (2d) 355.
48 (1917) 242 U. S. 394, 401.
49 (1896) In re Bronson 150 N. Y. 1, 44 N. E. 707; Greves v. Shaw(1899) 173 Mass. 205, 53 N. E. 372; Kingsbury v. Chapin (1907) 196 Mass.
533, 82 N. E. 700; Dixon v. Russell (1910) 79 N. J. L. 490, 76 Atl. 982;
Hopper v. Edwards (1916) 88 N. J. L. 471, 96 Atl. 667; and People v.
Griffith (1910) 245 Ill. 532, 92 N. E. 313.
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But regardless of whether the United States Supreme Court
will apply the First National case to questions of ancillary ad-
ministration, the currently accepted view in Missouri is that
stock in Missouri corporations, owned by a non-resident de-
cedent, is not property within this state when there are no debts
due Missouri citizens, or unpaid inheritance taxes. Such was
the holding of our Supreme Court en banc, in the case of Lohman
v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.50 In this case the Court said,
"The question of who is the owner of the certificate depends up-
on the law of the place where the certificate is"; that shares of
a Missouri corporation, represented by appropriate certificates
of stock, constitute property in themselves, and have a situs for
purposes of ancillary administration, under the facts there in-
volved, in the state of the domicile of the non-resident owner.
The Court stated, however, that if there were debts due Missouri
citizens, or taxes owed to the state, a different situation would
exist. 51
Does the First National case apply to the federal estate tax?
This question was squarely presented to the United States Board
of Tax Appeals in the case of Estate of Garvan, the First Na-
tional Bank of Boston, Admr. v. Commissioner.52 In this case
Garvan died domiciled in Australia. At that time he owned
certificates of stock in corporations organized under the laws of
various states of this country, as well as in corporations organ-
ized under the laws of foreign countries. These certificates
r (1930) 326 Mo. 819, 33 S. W. (2d) 112.
51 Those interested in the lack of power of a Missouri Public Administra-
tor to take out ancillary administration upon stock in a Missouri corpora-
tion owned by a nonresident decedent should consult Lohman v. Kansas
City Southern Ry. Co. (1930) 326 Mo. 868, 33 S. W. (2d) 117 and Lohman
v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. (1930) 326 Mo. 842, 33 S. W. (2d) 118,
both decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri en banc: Fairchild v. Loh-
man (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 252; and Norrie v. Kansas City
Southern Ry. Co. (D.C. S. D. N.Y. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 158, aff'd Norrie v.
Lohman (C. C. A. 2, 1926) 16 F. (2d) 355. See also R. S. Mo. (1929) sec.
273, providing for a so-called short term administration. As to the situs
of stock for purposes of service by publication in a suit to establish title
thereto, compare Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co. (1900) 177 U. S. 1.
r-Commerce Clearing House Board of Tax Appeals Service, Feb. 25,
1932, no. 7449.
For a study of international double taxation see The Tax Magazine is-
sues of May and October 1931 and of January 1932, published by Commerce
Clearing House, Inc.
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were held by the First National Bank solely for the collection
of the income therefrom for the account of the decedent. The
Revenue Act of 1926, under which the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue sought to make the certificates subject to a federal
estate tax, provided that the tax should be imposed upon the
transfer of the net estate of non-residents of the United States ;53
that the value of the net estate should be determined, in the case
of a non-resident, by making certain specified deductions from
that part of his gross estate which at the time of his death was
"situated" in the United States ;54 and that for this purpose
"stock in a domestic corporation owned and held by a non-
resident decedent shall be deemed property within the United
States . . . "5 The Revenue Act contained no specific pro-
vision as to the property location of stock in foreign corpora-
tions. The Garvan estate urged that the case of First National
Bank of Boston v. Maine was controlling, and prevented the im-
position of the tax. The majority of the Board sustained this
contention as to the stock in foreign corporations, but denied it
as to stock in domestic corporations.
The reasoning of the Board is interesting not only because of
its effect upon the federal estate tax, but also because of its
bearing upon a state inheritance tax sought to be imposed under
analogous circumstances. As to the stock in domestic corpora-
tions, the Board distinguished the cases of First National Bank
v. Maine, Farmers Loan & Trust v. Minnesota, Baldwin V. Mis-
souri, and Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, upon the
ground that the underlying reason for those decisions was a de-
sire to prevent the injustice of multiplied taxation by two or
more states; and stated that the due process clauses of the Four-
teenth and Fifth Amendments are different, that the Revenue
Act clearly provides for the tax, and that it must assume that
Congress intended to, and could, repeal the maxim of mobilia
sequuntur personam as it applied to stock. 50
53 Sec. 301 (a).
r4 Sec. 303 (b).
5Sec. 303 (d).
56 The Board cited and relied upon In re Whiting's Estate (1896) 150
N. Y. 27, 44 N. E. 715, 716, in which the New York Court of Appeals held
that the New York legislature had power to employ the maxim mobilia
sequunter personam where necessary, and to disregard it where necessary
to attain its objects.
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Board Member Trammell dissented upon the ground that the
domestic stock was property at Garvan's domicile in Australia.
He answered the opinion of the majority by saying that First
National Bank v. Maine held that stock was property at the
domicile of the owner, except in cases of business situs, and was
controlling; that the power of the United States to tax is limited
to persons, property and transactions within the United States ;57
that in this case the person and property and the transfer, with
respect to which the tax was levied and which were the subject
of the tax, were and occurred beyond the jurisdiction of the
United States; that the Fifth Amendment, like the Fourteenth
Amendment, prevents the inheritance taxation of stock at the
place of incorporation; and that, since First National Bank v.
Maine was decided, Congress has no power by legislative fiat to
declare stock owned by a non-resident to be property within the
United States.
In view of the statement in First National Bank v. Maine that
no state other than the domicile of the owner has any taxable
relationship to the event-the transfer from the dead to the
living-which is the subject of the tax, it would seem that Mr.
Trammell's views are correct. This conclusion appears even
clearer as a result of the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of Heiner v. Donnan.5  In that case the Court held that
the restraint imposed upon legislation by the due process clauses
In connection with the Garvan case compare Sanchez v. Bowers, n. 38
above. Both of these cases refused to follow Article 50, Regulation 70
(1929 edition), which provides that bonds, stocks, notes, etc., physically
located in the United States, constitute property having a situs in the
United States. If Baldwin v. Missouri applies to federal estate taxes,
these cases are sound.
57 In support of this statement Mr. Trammell cited United States v. Erie
Railroad Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1877) 25 Fed. Cas. pp. 1019, 1021, decided by
Chief Justice Waite.
' (1932) 52 S. Ct. 358. In this case the Court held that that part of
Section 302 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1926, which provides that all trans-
fers within two years of death shall be conclusively presumed to have
been made in contemplation thereof, and therefore, taxable as a part of the
decedent's gross estate, was a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Incidentally, it should be noted that, in effect, this decision holds un-
constitutional a similar conclusive presumption in R. S. Mo. (1929) sec.
570.
As to the importance of this decision see par. 1990, C. C. H. (1932) Vol.
(2) in which it is pointed out that the decision makes possible millions of
dollars in refunds of federal estate taxes.
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of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is the same; and that
Congress cannot, by legislative fiat, enact into existence a fact
which does not exist in actuality.59 And if Mr. Trammell's dis-
sent is sound, then it is apparent that no state can levy an in-
heritance tax upon stock in one of its corporations owned by a
person domiciled in a foreign country at his death.
In conclusion it may be said that the case of First National
Bank v. Maine has had, and will have, a most profound effect
upon Federal and State death transfer taxes. It will also un-
doubtedly be widely extended to both income and property tax-
ation, for, as stated by Mr. Justice Sutherland:
The rule of immunity from taxation by more than one
state . . . is broader than the applications thus far made
of it.6O
If it is so extended, it will become a substantial shield of pro-
tection against the unjust double taxation sponsored by Black-
stone v. Miller.
5 If sec. 303 (d) does not enact a conclusive presumption of fact, it en-
acts one of law. Even so considered, the presumption is contrary to the
decision in First National Bank v. Maine.
60 As to the extension of this doctrine to state income taxes, see Rott-
schaefer, State Jurisdiction of Income (1931) 44 HARv. L. REV. 1075.
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